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‘Yeah, this one will be a good one’, or Tacit Knowledge, Prophylaxis, and the Border: 
Exploring Everyday Health Security Decisionmaking 
 
Abstract 
Approaching health security from a practice-theoretical perspective, this article advances our 
understanding of the everyday and locality in health security decisionmaking, and is guided by the 
overarching question: how is it determined when a health security threat is likely to be present at a 
point of entry? What knowledge informs everyday health security decisions at borders? Markedly little 
is known about health security decisionmaking, though conventional wisdom tells us that decisions are 
based on stringent processes, and – importantly – anchored in epidemiological knowledge. The 
assumed primacy of epidemiological knowledge in health security decisionmaking has been especially 
visible with emergent evidence-based responses to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic following sophisticated 
epidemiologic investigation. Is this (exclusively) the case, though? A twelve month period undertaking 
non-participant observation of Port Health Officers (PHOs) – who, under the auspices of he 
International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005), are responsible for numerous prophylactic measures at 
the UK Border – gives a unique, privileged entry point for understanding the health security 
decisionmaking process, and tells an altogether different story: one that foregrounds the role of tacit 
knowledge and intuition in health security decisionmaking. Bringing insights from the science and 
technology studies (STS) literature on tacit knowledge, in this article observed health risk taxonomies 
and corollary decisions in prophylactic border security are predicated almost exclusively on hunches 
and ‘just knowing’ something ‘doesn’t feel right’.    
 
Introduction  
Approaching health security from a practice-theoretical perspective, this article attends to the 
routine decisions of, and modes of knowledge mobilised by, frontline actors responsible for 
prophylactic bordering in the UK. In doing so, this article advances our understanding of the 
everyday and locality in health security decisionmaking. A burgeoning literature attends to 
questions of how security decisions are made. In particular, this literature considers 
discretionary security decisions in bordering spaces: when immigration, customs, and border 
security practitioners are ‘empowered to exercise public authority and afforded scope to 
decide how that authority should be exercised in particular circumstances’ (Pratt and Sossin, 
2009: 301; Hall, 2012; Heyman, 2009; Pratt, 2005). Notwithstanding, absent from this 
literature – and, curiously, the vast interdisciplinary literature on health security (for an 
overview see, Rushton, 2019; Rushton and Youde, 2014)  – is consideration of how health 
security decisions at borders are made. I say curiously in the case of the omission from the 
health security literature because after all, health security, as a response to the threat posed by 
(the rapid international spread of) zoonotic, food borne, and/or emerging infectious diseases 
implies and is invariably understood in terms of spatial segregation: the separation of healthy 
life from diseased bodies (or disease-contaminated objects), attempts at containing outbreaks, 
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and not least the policing of the flow and movement of anyone or anything potentially 
threatening to life – exogenous incursions to the social and political body from the ‘outside’. 
These longstanding, well-acknowledged linkages between health security and borders are 
discussed at length in literature (Bashford, 2006a, 2006b; Price-Smith, 2008) and have been 
made especially conspicuous by the various, novel ways the response to the (presently 
ongoing) SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has been ‘bordered’ (Ferhani and Rushton, 2020; Kenwick 
and Simmon, 2020). Based on extensive pre-COVID-19 fieldwork, this article sheds light on 
everyday health security decisionmaking at the UK border, and is guided by the following 
questions: how is it determined when a potential health security threat is likely to be present 
at a point of entry? What knowledge are health security decisions predicated on?  
 
Writing in mid-2021 against the backdrop of the (presently ongoing) SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, 
perhaps the above questions have yet to be given any rigorous attention in scholarship 
because the answers seem obvious (probably to the point of being axiomatic). Global public 
health emergencies are likely to pose intractable and recurring challenges throughout the 
course of the 21st century (Davies and Wenham, 2020; Harman, 2012; Lakoff, 2017; 
Wallace, 2016; Youde, 2020). Initially small and localised outbreaks – such as Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS), pandemic flu, Ebola, Zika, and COVID-19 – all 
heterogeneous in origin, prevalence, biological characteristics, transmissibility, and virulence 
– in an age of ever intensifying global circulation ‘can quickly spread across the entire world, 
killing millions in the process and infecting tens of millions more [bringing] harrowing 
devastation to lives, livelihoods and economies all around the planet’ (Elbe, 2021: 658). In 
sum, health security threats are invariably equated in both policy and academia with the rapid 
international spread of pathogens: contagion. Given this, then, any decision pertaining to 
when a threat is likely to be present at a point of entry – when someone or something is likely 
to be ‘carrying’ and therefore potentially introducing a health security threat at airports, 
seaports, and ground crossings – must therefore, be presumably based on and stringent 
processes, and crucially anchored in epidemiological knowledge: the scientific, systematic, 
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and data-driven study of the distribution (who, when, and where), patterns, and determinants 
of health and disease conditions in given populations. Here, I am thinking in particular about 
evidence-based remedial measures, algorithmic epidemiological (‘syndromic’) surveillance 
(Roberts and Elbe, 2017), and the deployment of recent epistemic developments such as the 
ability to now scientifically analyse genetic sequence information of pathogens in health 
security governance. Such sequence data can 
 
accelerate the completion of risk assessments by helping scientists to quickly characterise a new 
pathogen, understand its virulence, identify its likely natural reservoir, and evaluate the overall 
threat it poses [which in turn] enables scientists to virtually perform molecular epidemiology by 
comparing the detailed sequences of many different viruses, thereby tracing where, how and 
how quickly a new virus is spreading geographically. During the recent outbreaks of Ebola and 
SARS-CoV-2, for instance, analysis of sequence data allowed tracking of their spatio-temporal 
spread and it showed how different strains crossed borders and spread within countries, 
allowing for evidence-based border closures to limit its spread (Elbe, 2021: 660). 
 
How could the likely presence of a health security threat at borders possibly be assessed 
without being rooted in the basic principles of epidemiology? In this article, drawing on an 
extensive praxiographic study of Port Health Officers (PHOs) in the UK – who are 
responsible for numerous, routine prophylactic measures at the UK Border aimed at 
preventing the importation of infectious disease – I tell a different, and perhaps surprising 
story about health security decisions. The World Health Organization (WHO) publishes 
official guidance aimed at informing PHOs’ work (and the work of analogous frontline actors 
in other countries). This guidance stipulates: ‘Public health risks are identified by 
epidemiological evidence, direct observation or measurement (or any combination of these). 
The competent authority should evaluate the risk in terms of the epidemiological situation and 
the severity of the risk’ (WHO, 2011: 21). Despite this, over the course of my observations, 
something distinctive and unusual was going on: myriad health security decisions were being 
made constantly – Huysmans’ (2011: 372) ‘little security nothings’ – and these were 
witnessed firsthand.  
 
However, these decisions were, for the most part, not predicated on measurement, and 
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certainly not predicated on epidemiological knowledge in how we might expect (i.e. data-
driven epidemiology). Instead, PHOs ‘directly observed’ and ostensibly ‘just knew’ 
something ‘didn’t feel right’ (both phrases were repeated over the year to the point of feeling 
like a mantra). On several occasions practitioners turned to me and said, ‘yeah, this one will 
be fine’ (or variations thereof), before starting the sanitary inspection of a ship. This initially 
this took me by surprise: is it really possible to ‘just know’ a threat is present? Are routine 
health security decisions really predicted primarily and in the last instance on intuition – on 
gut feelings and hunches? Why was there variability in the decisionmaking I observed? Why 
did health risk taxonomies and corollary decisions seem to differ wildly depending on the 
locality of observations? To help answer these questions, and to understand and deconstruct 
this apparent ‘just knowing’ at the UK Border, I turn to the science and technology studies 
(STS) literature on tacit knowledge and intuition. 
 
Why turn specifically to STS? Though tacit knowledge is one of the lynchpins of practice 
theory, there is clear rationale for this manoeuvre: STS scholars have – perhaps more so than 
those any other discipline – long taken hunches and ‘just knowing’ seriously, and tacit 
knowledge has long been a ‘fundamental concept’ in thinking about and capturing the 
workings of scientific knowledge (re)production (Vogel and Dennis, 2018: 386). Illuminating 
and taking seriously the intricacies of tacit knowledge – defined here in the ‘classical’ STS 
sense of personal and private uncodified ‘know-how’ produced through trial and error, that is 
transmitted from person to person (Collins, 2010), and the pre-logical ‘tacit dimension’ 
(Polanyi, 1966) – enables us to make sense of, and account for, intuition in prophylactic 
decisionmaking. But surely there are stringent protocols to be followed, though? Yes, and as 
per the STS literature: codified, explicit knowledge like the WHO guidance I mentioned 
above – ‘information or instructions that can be formulated in words or symbols and, 
therefore, can be stored, copied, and transferred by impersonal means, such as in written 
[‘official’ or otherwise] documents’ (Mackenzie and Spinardi, 1995: 45), which are seen as 
universal and devoid of context – should not necessarily be dismissed outright, but should not 
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be assumed to be the primary driver of decisionmaking in this context. Moreover, as 
MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995: 46 emphasis added) suggest of science (broadly conceived): 
if it ‘rests upon specific, hard-to-acquire, tacit skills, then there is a sense in which scientific 
knowledge is always local knowledge’. This, then, goes some way to help understand why 
decisions are, inescapably, contingent and why they seemed to vary depending on the locality.  
 
In light of lacunae in consideration of the forms of knowledge involved in health security 
decisionmaking in International Relations (IR) this article breaks new ground.  By drawing on 
extensive periods of fieldwork, this article also presents unique empirical insights into banal, 
routine health security practice – a marked shift away from the histrionics of securitisation 
theory, which has become embedded in the lore of health security research. The discussion 
proceeds as follows. First, the article begins by setting out the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings of the research: conceiving health security from a practice-theoretical stance 
gave rise to the adoption of appropriate praxiographic methods. In the second section, the 
article unpacks the idea of tacit knowledge and intuition in greater detail. Bringing insights 
from the STS literature, this section gives a nuanced theoretical reading of the apparent 
hunches in health security decisionmaking. The third and final section, interlaced with 
vignettes, I demonstrate intuition ‘in practice’ by engaging with the empirical findings of the 
fieldwork. 
 
Beyond Copenhagen: Health Security as Practice 
This research grew out of frustration with the predominance of securitisation theory in the 
health security literature, and the initial motivation for this research was to consider the 
everyday workings of health security – something by and large overlooked in the literature. 
What (if any) physical and mental activities are health security practitioners doing day-today? 
What knowledge is enacted? What objects are used? In what communities are practices taking 
place? Where are such routine activities taking place and what do these sites look like? What 
training (if any) do practitioners receive? How do they make decisions? Such questions are 
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given scant attention in literature. Seemingly lagging behind the rest of critical security 
studies, the reliance on a securitisation framework has resulted in health security research 
overwhelmingly focusing on exploring the framing of, and responses to, major outbreak 
events. The canon is replete with productive and insightful analyses of health crises, or else 
singular outbreak events, through the lens of securitiation, which attend to securitising actors, 
speech acts, exceptional measures, referent object, and audience acceptance (Curley and 
Herington, 2011; Davies, 2008; Elbe, 2006; McInnes and Rushton, 2013; Wenham and 
Farias, 2019; Youde, 2008). Admittedly, it would be unfair of me to suggest this is 
necessarily ‘wrong’: writing in mid-2021, during a time of uncertainty and in a state of 
emergency, I am cognisant of the worth and importance of exploring such outbreak events, 
and regardless, securitisation has opened fruitful lines of enquiry – both pertaining 
specifically to health issues and more broadly (Balzacq et al., 2016). Notwithstanding, the 
focus on singular events is superficial: myriad critiques and revisions of securitisation stress 
that its ‘logic’ is predicated on presentism and decisionism – a Schmittian ‘crisis modality’. 
Critical security studies has long stressed the significance of looking beyond moments of 
rupture by showing that security ‘works’ routinely at an everyday level outside the domain of 
the exception, and not simply in response to singular events (see, for example, Balzacq, 2008; 
Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2006, 2011). Rather than being totalising as suggested by 
securitisation theory – a coherent modality of problem definition and problem resolution – 
security is in fact dispersed, unspectacular, and not necessarily constructed linguistically with 
exceptionalist grammar (McDonald, 2008). Taking these critiques as a springboard, the 
intention was understand more about the banal security routines that occupy the ‘space 
between’ health crises: that the fieldwork was undertaken pre-COVID-19 afforded 
unrestricted access to the everyday. Starting with a normative given – that health has been 
linked with national and international security – and in line with empirical and theoretical 
developments in critical IR scholarship typically described as the ‘practice turn’ (Adler and 
Pouliot, 2011; Bueger, 2014; Bueger and Gadinger, 2015), the desire to move away from 
securitisation directed my attention to practice theory: a collection of conceptualisations 
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which focus on practices as the core unit of analysis – socially meaningful, routinised patterns 
of action. These patterns of action are a combination of a) corporeal and mental activities; b) 
material ‘things’ or artefacts and the ways in which they are operationalised, and finally c) the 
background knowledge which gives practices meaning (this will be considered in more depth 
in the following sections).  
 
The materiality of practice, through either objects or corporeality, means studying security 
practices means engaging with security practitioners: seeking ‘proximity’ to the carriers 
(human or otherwise) of practice. ‘Turning’ to practice means assuming a total change in 
perspective, and adopting a distinctive methodology. This is turn directs us to praxiography: a 
research strategy aiming to make sense of practices. On one hand it entails direct observation 
of practices; on the other hand ‘the praxiographer is interested in what is by definition not 
readily available: the implicit background knowledge. To reconstruct background knowledge 
requires interpretation’ (Beuger, 2014: 388). Though the two-pronged approach to engaging 
with practices described here is reductive (see Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2002) making sense 
of practices gives rise to employing specific methods: in many respects, participant/non-
participant observation is ‘the’ appropriate method for praxiographic research. Moreover, in 
an attempt to make sense of practices (as they may not speak for themselves) and to access 
background knowledge, aside from observation, methods such as expert interviews may have 
a role in praxiographic research; likewise the analysis of documents may be of use – not only 
elucidating practices, but also giving insights into background knowledge: ‘a major type of 
document for praxiography is manuals and handbooks that provide guidance on how to carry 
out activities’ (Beuger, 2014: 401).  
 
Accordingly, twelve months between October 2018 and October 2019 were spent undertaking 
non-participant observation of PHOs at five sites across the UK: Manchester Port Health 
Authority (PHA); Mersey PHA; Manchester Airport; London Stansted Airport, and London 
Gatwick Airport. PHOs are by training environmental health officers, but receive no formal 
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training in Port Health; instead they learn and internalise knowledge ‘on the job’. Reflecting 
quirks in the historical implementation of health security at borders, they are formally 
employed in two different ways. At airports, PHOs work within local authorities (LAs). So, 
time spent at Gatwick Airport was with the Port Health team within Crawley Council, 
Stansted Airport falls under the auspices of Uttlesford Council; Manchester Airport is within 
Manchester City Council. At seaports, PHOs work in autonomous bodies known as Port 
Health Authorities (PHAs). As such, both will be referred to herein as PHAs. PHAs as 
organisations, and PHOs are responsible for two interlinked strands of routine, prophylactic 
work at the UK Border. Firstly, the detection, assessment, notification, reporting and control 
of public health risks at points of entry in order to prevent the international spread of 
communicable disease or contamination, which may result in outbreaks. This work ensures 
the UK meets its obligations under the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) – which 
were constituted to ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to 
the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public 
health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’  
(WHO, 2016: Article 2). Rather than in response to public health events, what amount to a 
cordon sanitaire is enacted continuously. Secondly, is the control of imports: material objects 
(potentially) ‘threatening’ to public health. Another prophylactic, exclusionary cordon 
sanitaire is at play continuously, but is aimed at preventing ‘risky things’ – primarily, though 
not exclusively, foodstuffs: high risk animal products potentially carrying zoonoses (hence 
the link to infectious disease control), or high risk foods not of animal origin (‘risk’ owing 
primarily to naturally occurring, or otherwise, contaminants) – from entering into the country. 
In this article I focus on the first of these two regimes. Moreover, I focus on decisionmaking 
at seaports. Though routine infectious disease controls do take place at seaports and airports, 
curiously – and in light of COVID-19 making me question the veracity of post-millennium 
Global Health Security – the mechanisms at the former are considerably much more robust. 
In sum, I have vanishingly little to say about controls at airports, because as will become 
clear, there is no ‘aircraft sanitation regime’ to speak of.  
 9 
 
PHAs are responsible for sanitary inspections of all international voyaging ships, which are 
required to hold a valid Ship Sanitation Certificate (SSC), which PHAs are responsible for the 
issuance ofi. SSCs work under the auspices of, and are a central (though esoteric) component 
of, the IHR (2005) – the ‘primary international instrument and governance mechanism that 
guides collective behaviour in the event of a disease outbreak’ (Davies and Wenham, 2020: 
1235), having been established ‘to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public 
health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and 
restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international 
traffic and trade’ (WHO, 2016: 1)ii. An agreement between 196 countries, the IHR establishes 
‘minimum capacities to detect, assess and report public health events’, and set out measures at 
ports, airports and ground crossings to stymie the spread of health risks to neighbouring (if 
applicable) countries. In short, SSCs are certificates confirming the absence of public health 
risks on board ships, the issuance of which follows the inspection of a ship’s galley; 
pantry/stores; quarters; evidence of vectors/standing water; potable and ballast water; solid 
and medical waste; engine room, and medical facilities. ‘When a public health risk exists, 
control measures that will reduce the risk to an acceptable level should be identified. The 
conveyance operator is responsible for controlling any onboard risks. Nevertheless, the 
competent authority should provide reasonable assistance to identify suitable and relevant 
control options’ (WHO, 2011: 34). In this case a Ship Sanitation Control Certificate (SSCC) 
is issued; should no risks be identified a Ship Sanitation Exemption Certificate (SECC) is 
issued. Should risk be identified, control (i.e. remedial) measures equate to environmental, 
non-pharmaceutical countermeasures such as disinfection or disinsection. In the event of 
imminent public health risk being identified, PHAs (with the Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency (MCA)) will detain the ship until control measures have been applied. 
 
SSCs are of particular importance for the prevention and control of public health risks on board 
ships on international voyages. They provide internationally recognized documentation 
regarding the sanitary conditions of a ship, while reducing the need for further and more 
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frequent inspections of the ship during the period for which the certificate is valid (but with 
options for additional inspections under certain limited circumstances). SSCs are designed to 
identify, assess and record any public health risks, and the consequent control measures that 
should be taken, while ships are in port. Public health risks are identified by epidemiological 
evidence, direct observation or measurement (or any combination of these). (WHO, 2011: 15, 
21) 
 
Throughout the fieldwork, I was privileged to observe over seventy Ship Sanitation 
inspections and ‘boarding inspections’ (random spot checks). There is more to the ship 
sanitation regime than can discussed here (e.g. administration, and the requirement for ships 
to pre-notify port operators/port authorities of their arrivaliii), so the following discussion 
provides a snapshot of how a ship is inspected: in line with WHO guidance, it details how 
PHOs board and move around ships, observe, and in turn identify the presence of (potential) 
health security threats. 
 
‘Yeah mate, you just know...all this is more of an art than science, I guess’: Tacit 
Knowledge and Intuition 
The previous section established that practices should be understood as a combination of 
bodily movements and mental activities; material things, and finally the background 
knowledge, which practices depend on: that which gives ‘the social and political its stability 
and provides for meaningful action’ (Bueger, 2014: 387). This idea of background knowledge 
needs more attention, though. Whilst practice theoretical approaches share a number of 
commitments, their core claim is arguably that ‘“the social”, “the cultural”, and “the political” 
are based primarily and in the last instance in implicit knowledge and meaning […] a type of 
knowledge which is rarely verbalized and is hence not easily readable from signifiers, speech, 
and discourse. Practices are […] the mediator and carrier of such knowledge. (Bueger, 2014: 
386). Numerous scholars have made developments regarding the knowledge underpinning 
practices. Schatzki (2002, 2005) advanced the idea of ‘background knowledge’, comprised of: 
a) practical, ‘hands on’ understandings or know-how; b) rules, and c) a teleological 
structuring (i.e. that which sets the expected goal/purpose of a given practice). He suggests 
that rules are ‘explicit formulations that prescribe, require, or instruct that such be done, said, 
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or the case’ (Schatzki, 2005: 471). The structuring he talks of ‘is an array of ends, projects, 
uses (of things), and even emotions that are acceptable for participants in the practice’ 
(Schatzki, 2005: 471). Similarly, Reckwitz’s (2002: 249) take on background knowledge is 
‘in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge’. 
Both of these incisive, influential takes on background knowledge have made inroads into 
much of the IR engagement with practice, and crucially both highlight a distinction between 
tacit and explicit knowledge. As I noted earlier, the IR engagement with practice does 
acknowledge and discuss tacit knowledge – ineffable, practical know how – however my 
feeling during and immediately after the fieldwork was that current work is rather hazy about 
what tacit knowledge actually is, and generally assumes it is aggregate. By aggregate, I mean 
understanding tacit knowledge by ‘reference to its opposite’ (Revill and Jefferson, 2014: 
599), and reducing tacit knowledge to simply ‘whatever is not articulated’.  
 
Explicit knowledge can be refracted, and should be taken to mean a combination of two 
things: a) ‘explicit, fully articulable knowledge that can be conveyed from the knower to a 
recipient by means of language’ (Revill and Jefferson, 2014: 599), and b) Schatzki’s (2005: 
471) rules: ‘explicit formulations that prescribe, require, or instruct that such be done, said, or 
the case’. These though should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. So with Ship Sanitation 
inspections: PHOs may speak to one another either face-to-face or over the phone and offer 
guidance about an identified ‘problem’ or ‘risk’ on a ship (this did in fact happen twice 
throughout the fieldwork). However, in doing so PHOs may make reference to documents 
such as the IHR/or WHO (2011) Handbook for Inspection of Ships and Issuance of Ship 
Sanitation Certificates (i.e. rules): ‘explicit formulations that prescribe, require, or instruct 
that such be done, said, or the case’ (Schatzki, 2005: 471), that give practices context and 
meaning. Here, our attention turns specifically to tacit knowledge.  
 
STS has gone further than IR in elucidating the specifics of tacit knowledge (Collins, 2010; 
Hutchins, 1995; MacKenzie and Spinardi, 1995; Mukerji, 2009; Revill and Jefferson, 2014; 
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Vogel, 2006, 2013; Vogel and Dennis, 2018). The following typology of tacit knowledges is 
it not necessarily accepted homogenously across STS. Notwithstanding a multiplicity of 
forms of tacit knowledge can (or, rather, should) be taken into consideration when attending 
to security and/or international practices. Collins (2010) for instance speaks of, inter alia, 
‘logistically demanding knowledge’, ‘concealed knowledge’, ‘ostensive knowledge’, 
‘mismatched saliences’ and ‘unrecognised knowledge’. These can all be regarded as forms of 
‘inadvertent’ or ‘weak’ tacit knowledge’: ‘that which could, under certain circumstances, be 
rendered explicit but either through inability, unwillingness or practicality remains unwritten 
and implicit’ (Revill and Jefferson, 2014: 599). So with the above example of PHOs, should 
the advice – the fully articulable knowledge – have been withheld (deliberately or otherwise) 
for whatever reason, that should be regarded as ‘weak tacit knowledge’. Emphasising the 
importance of interaction between experts and/or assimilation, other, important nuances in the 
STS literature on tacit knowledge include ‘communal’ or ‘collective’ tacit knowledge 
(Collins, 2007, 2010), which translates into ideas such as ‘local knowledge systems’ (Knorr-
Cetina, 1991, 1992; Pickering, 1995). There are two broad conceptualisations of collective 
tacit knowledge in STS. First, and typified by MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995), suggests that 
various types of expertise may (or otherwise) be incorporated into a given community of 
practice working towards a common goal. The failure to incorporate expertise as required has 
the potential to result in stagnation (or in practice theoretical parlance, fluidity/ordering). 
Second is the idea of ‘communally synthesised tacit knowledge’ (Vogel, 2006; Collins, 
2010). This is borne out of ongoing interactions between experts: such interactions in turn 
give rise to ‘new forms of knowledge that become integrated in the community, rather than 
residing in particular individuals […] the embedded nature of knowledge in the social and 
infrastructural environment’ (Revill and Jefferson, 2014: 603). Both of these emphasise 
expert interaction – ‘something that human individuals […] can acquire, because of their 
special and continual access to the location of the knowledge — which is the social 
collectivity’ (Collins, 2007: 261). The prophylactic controls discussed herein are predicated – 
at least in part – on local knowledge, and can therefore only ‘work’ in the individual ‘sites’ – 
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within the context of local systems of practice (Knorr-Cetina, 1991, 1992; Pickering, 1995). 
To illustrate: 
 
[The PHO] invites me to take a seat in [their office and] begins checking pre-arrival 
notifications […] Whilst several ships are due into the Port today, there have been no requests 
for SSCs. The ship movements are being crosschecked against a local and European database, 
and [the PHO] say that this forms the basis of the ‘local’ risk assessment process. The local 
database is colour coded and contains details about each ship, as well as ‘sanitary conditions’ on 
board during last inspection/SSC carried out; same set up with the European database though is 
not colour coded. The local database is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and apparently contains 
the details of hundreds – maybe more – ships. On entering the details of [the ship] including its 
port/country of registry, operator and so on, the ‘sanitary conditions’ are apparently fine, so is 
coded green.  [The PHO] explains that this combined with the pre-arrivals submitted forms the 
‘daily risk profile’ and ‘amber’, and ‘red’ ships being ‘ones to look out for’. No ships are 
boarded today. (Field observation, January 2019) 
 
The above describes the scrutiny of ships’ ‘pre-arrival’ information (see note iii) and this 
vignette stresses the centrality of locally integrated knowledge to the prophylactic 
decisionmaking process. In this instance, the PHO decided not to act (i.e. to not board any 
ships due into port that day). Each PHA had, respectively, conspicuously different and 
apparently unsystematic ideas about a) what constitutes/the nature of public health risks, 
which never actually tallied with the WHO description (see note ii) and b) the ‘origin’ of 
potential risks: one PHO suggested how ‘[they] look at voyages and [are] always asking what 
risks are associated with particular countries’. The WHO describes ‘affected area’ as a 
‘geographical location specifically for which health measures have been recommended by 
WHO under International Health Regulations (2005)’ (WHO, 2011: 7). Despite this, whilst 
generally conflated with specific countries (i.e. the ship’s port of registry, where it had sailed 
from) or else with specific shipping lines, risk was conceived in markedly different ways 
depending on the authority (i.e. within each local ‘knowledge system’): some authorities 
‘took issue’ with particular ‘dodgy’ countries (to politely paraphrase one PHO), whilst others 
did not. Moreover, this was seemingly never actually predicated on countries being affected 




‘[W]e can know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi, 1966: 4): Tacit Knowledge, Intuition, and 
Security Decisions 
 
The final key idea from STS is somatic tacit knowledge. This is the corollary of the 
‘limitations of the human body and brain’ (Collins, 2007): the ‘sixth sense’, typified by the 
oft-cited example of riding a bike – something our bodies do, but cannot be articulated and 
thus transferred to somebody else. Instructions along the lines of ‘sit on the saddle and 
peddle’ or ‘try and balance yourself’ have little to no purchase. Instead, riding a bike is 
something learnt through trying, inevitably falling off, and trying again; in other words, some 
actions cannot be learnt from (explicit) instructions. Somatic tacit knowledge – learning by 
doing – is, in many respects, the ‘classical’ STS take on tacit knowledge. Though all of the 
above takes from STS are incisive, it is somatic tacit knowledge in particular that has 
profound implications for how we think about the health security decisions I observed, which 
in turn guides us first towards the tacit dimension, and then intuition. Linked principally with 
Michael Polanyi’s writings about scientific knowledge production (1966, 2005) – all of the 
above is indebted to his work – the tacit dimension, is a more capacious take on tacit 
knowledge and also accounts for intuition. For Polanyi (1966) the tacit dimension – pre-
logical knowing – is not comprised of simply somatic tacit knowledge (though this is central), 
but also feelings, imaginings, informed guesses, and hunches: ‘passions’, which may inform 
scientific discovery. Polanyi’s phenomenology does sound at worst occult and deeply 
abstract; at best simply like highly subjective introspection. However, neurological and 
biological research does support the tacit dimension and ‘the idea that knowledge is an 
embodied process and that all our conscious attention is dependent on a whole range of 
unconscious, tacit processes’ (Nightingale, 2003: 162). Moreover, consciousness ‘is a private, 
first-person-perspective, subjective phenomena that brings neural images (like smells, 
memories and sounds) from tacit subsidiary awareness into conscious focal awareness’ 
(Nightingale, 2003: 162 emphasis added). Echoing Edelman (1992) from a neurological 
perspective, learning, categorisation, and memory are hard to divorce one from one another 
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and ‘many forms of memory can only be recalled by doing […] these include many scientific 
and technical procedures’ (Nightingale, 2003: 157; Anderson, 1983; Edelman, 1989). This 
directs us specifically towards intuition.  
 
Within Polanyi’s tacit dimension, intuition is the direct product of somatic tacit knowledge 
and can be taken to mean impulses about judgements or decisions: patterns that have been 
built up over time, and lead to making sense of a given situation, and what course of action to 
take, instinctively, without conscious, deliberate reasoning. To explain: ‘Normal cognitive 
activity generates a set of mental states or beliefs that allow us to actively pre-empt the 
behaviour of the world’ (Nightingale, 2003: 160). When predictions turn out to be accurate, 
this ‘breeds [a feeling of] satisfaction’. On the other hand, when we fail to understand the 
world and cannot resolve problems we ‘breed [feelings of] tension and conflict’ (Turro, 1986: 
882). These gut feelings are trained during scientists’ apprenticeships so that ‘students who 
learn to tolerate the tensions that normally accompanies [sic] the process of resolving such 
intellectual conflicts often feel an excitement that is stimulating and rewarding in itself’ 
(Turro, 1986: 882). As scientists learn to solve problems, they learn to follow their gut 
feelings (Nightingale, 2003: 160). Hence for STS scholars, intuitive gut feelings are personal 
– being predicated on individual experience – and have to be learnt ‘in the laboratory’ and 
cannot be articulated. As there is no formal training for PHOs, ‘gut feelings’ similarly must 
be learnt ‘on the job’. 
 
‘My inspection starts as I get out of the car – you just know before you even get on’: 
Intuition in Practice  
This section explicates how ship inspections work, thereby showing ‘intuition in practice’. 
There is a clear ‘approach’ to undertaking the inspection of a ship, and clear order in which it 
is undertaken: an interview; an inspection, and closing interview/issuance of a new SSC (or 
otherwise). The sequence of the inspection is derived from explicit background knowledge, or 
rules. In this case WHO guidance, which recommends that inspections typically include ‘a 
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preliminary discussion with the ship’s operator or agent and the master on matters relating to 
the ship’s sanitation systems and procedures’ (WHO, 2011: 27). Moreover, guidance specifies 
that as part of this ‘preliminary discussion’ there is a review of documentation, which is sent 
in advance to PHAs. 
 
Generally, the inspector starts the inspection by introducing the team and outlining the objective 
of the inspection to the master. The inspector then receives information about operating 
conditions and safety rules on board from the master. This exchange should occur in a private 
space, if available. The inspection process is then outlined to the master, and the documentation 
in place is reviewed. (WHO, 2011: 29)   
 
This is before the inspection itself, which would generally take from one to two hours and 
entails primarily the ‘direct observation’ of all areas of the ship. As touched on earlier, the 
WHO suggests that the identification of public health risks is predicated on epidemiological 
evidence, direct observation or measurement (or any combination of the three). However, 
based on the fieldwork, seemingly at the heart of inspecting ships and identifying risks is 
direct observation. Put differently, this is rather than ‘measurement’ or ‘epidemiological’ 
evidence.  
 
We get out of the car, put on high visibility jackets, hard hats, and the PHO takes their rucksack 
with them. Walking to the ship the PHO points to the ship, nods and remarks: ‘it’ll be alright 
will this at it’s a Danish flag’. We board the ship and introduce ourselves as Port Health, which 
apparently doesn’t register with the crew […] Walking along the deck the officer is having a 
very good look around – particularly at some small collections/pools of water on the deck. I ask 
about this and [they] explain about reservoirs/vectorsiv. (Field observation, November 2018)  
 
On boarding we introduce ourselves as ‘quarantine’ and are directed to the ship’s office, and 
once there we are invited to take seats by the master who shakes our hands and offers us coffee. 
[The PHO] asks to see the following documentation: the ship’s particulars; the last SSC; crew 
list; MDH; last ten ports of call; garbage log; waste declaration; last potable water sample; 
ballast log; sickness log and the ship’s medical certificate. After the document review in the 
office, a series of questions are asked, the answers to which are recorded down on an ERF 
formv: ‘How is the ship, are you all well?’ ‘Any sickness on board?’ ‘Any animals or pets 
onboard?’ ‘Where was you last port of call?’ ‘Where is your next port of call?’ (Field 
observation, November 2018)  
 
From the bridge we begin to make our way around the ship. Carrying a torch and thermometer 
with [them], we inspect initially the ‘sanitary conditions’ in the crew’s quarters. [The officer] 
asks to look in a lower ranking room. Entering the officer looks around, holds [their] hand up to 
the air conditioning duct, and then takes a look in the bathroom. Once again, it is ambiguous 
what – if anything – [they] are actually looking for: the room is untidy, but beyond that it seems 
unclear what could possibly pose a ‘public health risk’ in here. Leaving the cabin I ask [the 
PHO] what it is [they] are looking for. For once I get a reply though after a noticeable pause: 
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‘well it’s getting a sense, I don’t know really, I guess a feeling for generally how clean the ship 
is and how well it is managed. Obviously as well, you know, any reservoirs or any signs of 
pests. We have ships riddled with them [see note iv]. You get to know what’s what’. We then 
move on to the ship’s hospital, where [the officer] asks to see the medical log and certificate 
once again. Looks through both, and questions the first officer about a recent case of ‘fever’ for 
which the captain prescribed paracetamol. 
 
The officer continues to look around much like during the inspection of crew’s quarters. 
[Officer] sniffs the bed sheets, then looks up at me and says ‘it’s often the best way to tell how 
clean something is’. Goes into the bathroom and opens the tap and brown water runs out: ‘you 
need to make sure that all your taps are opened regularly – stuff like legionella grows when the 
water isn’t moving’. We go down to the engine room: again [the officer] is looking around – for 
what isn’t entirely clear. Finally we move on to the galley/mess room, as well as the stores. 
 [The officer] asks to see the cleaning schedule and logs, purchasing records of the food as well 
as ‘in/out records’, pest record which [the officer] asks them about – ‘any cockroaches or 
anything within the past six months?’ and finally asks to see temperature records for the fridges. 
[The officer] looks around the galley/stores vacantly. (Field observation, January 2019)  
 
Having carried out the inspection, we all return to the bridge. [The officer] says that everything 
is fine but to make sure that the kitchen gets ‘good clean’. A new Ship Sanitation Exemption 
Certificate is issued: a thick sheet of paper, the PHA seal is adhered in a corner, and finally 
stamped. Copies are taken; handshake with the captain; we are escorted off the ship: ‘goodbye, 
sir’. (Field observation, November 2018) 
 
 
Figure 1. PHO boarding general cargo vessel  © The author, November 2018. 
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The WHO Handbook for Inspection of Ships and Issuance of Ship Sanitation Certificates is 
nearly one hundred and fifty pages long, and ‘the’ official reference on how ship inspections 
should be undertaken. In line with prior discussion the Handbook is an explicit formulation of 
prescribed ‘rules’. The Handbook proposes an order in which inspections could be carried 
out, and it also ‘proposes a sequence of inspection areas’ (WHO, 2011: 135): in other words 
which areas it recommends to inspect first, second, and so on (for instance the guidance 
suggests starting with crew quarters, before moving on to the galley, pantry and service 
areas). 
 
It follows the rationale that clean areas should be inspected first, followed by technical areas. 
This sequence enables the inspectors to avoid cross-contamination. In some critical areas like 
galleys, inspectors should demonstrate good hygiene practice by wearing clean disposable 
clothing (e.g. aprons, gloves, hair covering). (WHO, 2011: 135) 
 
The Handbook also suggests ‘technical equipment that could be available to ship inspectors to 
help them inspect ships’ (WHO, 2011: 137) – including devices such as protein-detecting 
swabs (‘to check appropriate cleaning of surfaces’), vermin indicator spray, to more banal 
objects such as rubber examination gloves, and watertight apron. Crucially though, the WHO 
Handbook has checklists for inspection of particulars in thirteen areas: quarters; galley, pantry 
and service areas; stores; child-care facilities; medical facilities; swimming pools and spas; 
solid and medical waste; engine room; potable water; sewage; ballast water; cargo holds, and 
finally other systems and areas (WHO, 2011). The galley, pantry, and service areas alone 
have a list of some forty-three specific ‘sub-areas’ to be inspected. Some of these are 
documents (e.g. ensuring there is a food safety plan in place) that would generally – though 
not consistently – be reviewed. Some ‘required’ areas such as identifying ‘food handlers or 
galley crew members [with] exposed cuts and wounds’ and in turn ensuring the wound is 
covered with a waterproof dressing/treated accordingly (WHO, 2011: 49) was never once 
observed. Likewise identifying ‘evidence of accumulated soil and grease on previously 
cleaned food contact surfaces’ WHO, 2011: 50). Cargo stores were never inspected, and 
consequently no risks were identified. Evidence of medicines that have passed expiry dates in 
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the ships’ hospitals was never identified. Galleys that seemed ‘sanitary’ to me were invariably 
regarded as ‘in need of attention’ by PHOs; conversely on one ship what appeared to me to be 
rodent droppings were either not seen, or overlooked (presumably the former – or certainly 
hopefully). Technical equipment, most notably devices such protein-detecting swabs (which 
work as protein residues equate to contamination) was never carried. Examination gloves 
were never worn. The sequence of inspections varied depending on the PHO. This is a 
vanishingly small number of examples of myriad.    
 
 
Figure 2. View from the bridge © The author, February 2019. 
 
As with the previous discussion of local knowledge, my point here in detailing official 
guidance (i.e. explicit background knowledge), then, is that with this strand of health security 
practice at least, there is seemingly – for the most part – conspicuous disconnect between 
explicit background knowledge and what is actually taking place on the ground during ship 
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inspections. This is not however, by any means, to suggest that explicit background 
knowledge is irrelevant: the IHRs (2005) and corollary written ‘rules’ give meaning and 
context to ship inspections as practice. Similarly, this is not to suggest that inspections were 
not robust: on the face of it, the suggestion of disconnect could be construed as my suggesting 
that, at best, PHOs are lax in undertaking ship inspections, and, at worst, months of 
prophylactic malpractice were observed. I, after all, am no expert and am no position to pass 
judgement on the vigour of inspections. Instead of suggesting anything such as malpractice, 
following the discussion in the previous section, this disconnect instead highlights the role of 
tacit knowledge generally, though particularly somatic tacit knowledge and intuition. 
Scientific knowledge production in the public imagination is generally at odds with what 
takes place in the laboratory. Following STS, the entire idea of trial and error is not consonant 
with ideals of reproducibility: ‘public accounts of science can differ considerably from 
informal accounts of how science actually takes place, and these public accounts frequently 
conceal the importance of tacit knowledge’ (Revill and Jefferson, 2014: 601)vi. Disconnect 
between the Ship Sanitation regime’s explicit background knowledge and the actual 
inspection of a ship is commensurate with the STS example of riding a bike: ‘[most] humans 
can demonstrate their knowledge of bike-riding only by bike-riding’ (Collins, 2007: 258). 
Here, the fact that PHOs could not once articulate to me what they were actually looking for 
on board is not because it could not be formalised per se, but rather it remained tacit because 
their knowledge could only be demonstrated in the act of undertaking a ship inspection. Put 
differently, the quotidian decisions attended to herein are predicated primarily, and in the last 
instance, on personal, practical know how: beyond instances of looking for specific evidence 
of public health risk on board vessels outlined by the WHO (for example signs of vermin or 
other vectors, or looking over ‘required’ documents) by and large, in the words of a PHO, it is 
primarily looking around and ‘getting a sense [or] a feeling for generally how clean the ship 
is’ at play.  
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As PHOs ‘get to know what’s what’ over time – which does make sense insofar as there is no 
formal training and instead learn ‘on the job’ – then ‘just knowing’ that something ‘doesn’t 
feel right’ can be construed as tacit knowledge in practice. Put differently, this just knowing – 
rather than anything occult – is intuition, which is the direct upshot of tacit knowledge: 
patterns built up over time (‘on the job’), and making sense of a given situation (the presence 
of public health risks on board vessels), and what course of action to take (deciding to issue a 
SSC or otherwise), instinctively, without conscious, deliberate reasoning. ‘Gut feelings’ are 
personal – based entirely on individual experience – learnt not ‘in the laboratory’ but on the 
bridge, in the galley, or on the deck. As such they cannot be articulated. This, in turn, gives 
rise to ‘a priori (intuitive) backdrop of expectations’ enabling ‘instantaneous comprehension 
or apprehension of an object or an event in the past, present, or future’ (Turro, 1986: 886, 
900). This pre-logical knowing acts an unconscious ‘filter’, and therefore contouring 
conscious prophylactic decisions. 
 
Conclusion  
How is it determined when a potential health security threat is likely to be present at a point 
of entry? What modes of knowledge are health security decisions predicated on? My 
inspiration for this article stems from an observation from the field: during a twelve month 
praxiographic study of PHOs, and lengthy periods of non-participant observation, for the 
most part, practitioners seemingly ‘just knew’ something ‘didn’t feel right’. Rather than 
seeing, as I assumed (wrongly) would be the case, decisions being anchored in 
epidemiological knowledge – the scientific, systematic, and data-driven study of the 
distribution (who, when, and where), patterns, and determinants of health and disease 
conditions in given populations – instead, frontline practitioners were primarily making 
prophylactic decisions based on something intangible: hunches and gut feelings. As such, 
defining tacit knowledge in the ‘classical’ STS sense of uncodified, ‘know-how’ produced 
through trial and error, this article presented a nuanced reading of the ‘just knowing’ 
underpinning everyday health security decisions. Accounting for not just tacit knowledge, but 
 22 
the pre-logical ‘tacit dimension’ (Polanyi, 1966) – enables us to make sense of, and account 
for, such intuition and hunches in. Personal, practical know how gives rise to intuition, which 
is, in turn, experience translated into practice: impulses about judgements or decisions 
patterns that have been built up over time, and lead to making sense of a given situation, and 
what course of action to take, instinctively, without conscious, deliberate reasoning. These 
intuitive ‘gut feelings’ are personal – being predicated on individual experience – and have to 
be learnt ‘on the job’: ‘a priori (intuitive) backdrop of expectations’ enabling ‘instantaneous 
comprehension or apprehension of an object or an event in the past, present, or future’ (Turro, 
1986: 886, 900). Given there is no formal training for PHOs, these ‘gut feelings’ similarly 
must be learnt ‘on the job’. In sum, this article advances our understanding of the everyday 
and locality in health security decisionmaking.  
 
So what? What possibilities does this article opens up for the political and for research? How 
should this article lead us to think differently about health security decisionmaking, and 
health security more broadly? Unfortunately my overall message in this article is probably not 
going to offer much in the way of comfort or reassurance (far from it in fact) with regards to 
health security, or indeed pandemic control. It would be remiss of me to neglect the obvious 
at this point. World events have happened since this fieldwork, which attended to some of the 
routine practices enabling and maintaining the IHR: the ‘primary international instrument and 
governance mechanism that guides collective behaviour in the event of a disease outbreak’ 
(Davies and Wenham, 2020: 1235) which were instituted to ‘prevent, protect against, control 
and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are 
commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade’ (WHO, 2016: Article 2). Ship Sanitation 
Certificates – as a central though neglected preventative or prophylactic component of the 
IHR – are meant to keep us safe? This? If I had told you, outside the context of this article, 
that one of the key insights from my time at the coalface – the only real frontline of defence 
against nasties such as the SARS-CoV-2 virus – is that practitioners paid attention to features 
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that they learned to treat as revealing, such as how the smell of bed linen can give important 
clues to the likely presence of a health security threat, you would probably have laugh and 
looked at me incredulously, to say the least. I appreciate that this might not be the case in 
other communities of practice responsible for Ship Sanitation inspections (and that may well 
form the basis of a future, fruitful research agenda). Notwithstanding, whilst I have not 
necessarily sought to downplay sophisticated prophylactic mechanisms (such as surveillance 
systems), this article has shed light on a rather unsophisticated, obsolete regime – one, for the 
most part, curiously devoid of epidemiological knowledge. If there is a form of legitimacy 
being given to security decisions through their assumed anchoring in epidemiological 
knowledge, what does this mean for locating intuition at the prophylactic border when 
articulated against this ‘scientific’ background? If, increasingly, in the context of increased 
automation and standardisation in decisionmaking the legitimation for bordering decisions is 
technology and therefore, how decisions are embedded in technicised (i.e. algorithmic) 
bordering, what does this more for intuition at the prophylactic border? In this sense then, the 
foregrounding of intuition in this article, raises important questions about the modes of 
knowledge underpinning and legitimating health security – something IR needs to pay closer 
attention to. 
Notes 
                                                        
i The ‘Ship Sanitation regime’ is global. All international voyaging ships are required to carry a valid 
SSC, though may not be required for free pratique (in lay terms permission to enter a port); SSCs may 
be issued by competent authorities at WHO ‘authorised ports’ globally. Whilst I attend to the workings 
of the regime in the UK, the analysis of other countries may form the basis of edifying future research 
agendas. An up to date list of approved ports may be found online: 
https://www.who.int/ihr/ports_airports/IHR-list-of-Authorized-ports-to-issue-Ship-Sanitation-
Certificates.pdf?ua=1 
ii According to the IHR (2005), ‘public health risk means a likelihood of an event that may affect 
adversely the health of human populations, with an emphasis on one which may spread internationally 
or may present a serious and direct danger’ (WHO, 2011: 20). 
iii For completion it is worth noting that all ships are required to ‘pre-notify’ using the Consolidated 
European Reporting System (CERS) (enshrined in the Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information 
System Directive (2002/59/EC). Along with this, the other key document submitted to PHAs is – in 
accordance with the IHRs – the Maritime Declaration of Health (MDH) (a document giving assurance 
of the health (or otherwise) on board a ship). UK law does not require the MDH. Should a ship require 
a SSC, a ship’s captain will request it at the time of pre-notification. Scrutinising the pre-arrival 
documents is an important aspect of routine surveillance, ship sanitation inspections, and particularly 
boarding inspections. In line with the following discussion, intuition is certainly at play ‘in the office’, 
and similarly informs security decisions (hence with boarding inspections deciding whether or not to 
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inspect a ship is ultimately a security decision). Notwithstanding, the real ‘work’ of inspecting a ship 
for a SSC is done on board, hence its focus. 
iv‘On board, mosquitoes, rats, mice, cockroaches, flies, lice and rat fleas are all capable of transmitting 
disease […] Monitoring and control of vectors and reservoirs is necessary to maintain health on ships. 
Standing water caused by heavy rainfall or overflow can act as breeding sites for mosquitoes. This can 
then increase the potential for exposure to vector-borne diseases such as dengue fever, malaria and 
West Nile fever’ (WHO, 2011: 125).  
v Evidence Report Form (ERF) is a separate document to the SSCC/SSEC, and is used to record any 
additional findings from a ship inspection.  
vi
 Revill and Jefferson’s observation is important here with regards to any potential (mis)interpretations 
of this article: what we imagine is taking place (be it in the laboratory, in this case the border, or any 
highly specialised field) is seemingly at odds with what actually is occurring. Just as trial and error are 
at odds with public ideals of reproducibility in science, intuition is at odds with ideals of uniform, 
standard decisions in the broader context of a shift towards objectivity (i.e. automation) in 
decisionmaking (Broeders and Hampshire, 2013; Dekkers et al., 2016, 2019; Lyon and Haggerty, 
2012). For policy makers and legal scholars who regard decisionmaking as discretion, and discretion 
simply as a way of interpreting rules, any other take on decisionmaking for them is synonymous with 
arbitrariness. I am therefore cognisant of stressing that in the context of increased automation, my 
argument herein should not be equated with arbitrariness: as long as human agents (and by extension 
private, personal knowledge) are involved in decisionmaking, subjectivity and variability is 
inescapable. In this sense, both in research and policy, grater recognition of, and considerably more 
attention to personal forms of knowledge must be made in relation to security (decisionmaking) in IR. 
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